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Introduction 
Derivative instruments bear a striking resemblance to a double-edged sword. 
While some investors made fortunes using these financial tools, others have experienced 
economic ruin. As a result of some surprisingly large losses incurred by a wide variety of 
investors, many companies are reconsidering their risk management methods. 
Accordingly, the dollar volume of derivative sales declined by 94% for the first quarter of 
1995 (Norris 1995). 
This decline in derivative sales is due to both big losses and the bad publicity 
surrounding derivatives litigation (Norris 1995). Small public institutions, as well as 
companies with millions of dollars in assets, became losers. For example, Orange 
County, California lost $2 billion in 1994 using derivatives (Zuckerman 1995). In the 
same year, Proctor & Gamble, which employs a risk management committee, lost $157 
million (Loomis 1994). 
As a result of such losses, many lawsuits have foJlowed. For example, Proctor & 
Gamble has filed a suit for $130 million, plus unspecified punitive damages, against the 
purveyor of its derivatives, Bankers Trust. The management of Proctor & Gamble 
claimed it was misled in the purchase of high risk derivatives (Loomis 1994). Bankers 
Trust claims the deal was not unique and that Proctor & Gamble fully understood the 
risks involved. Lawsuits such as this one raise complex legal issues which may remain 
unsettled for quite some time. Regardless of the outcome, these lawsuits may have 
slowed down the market enough to allow regulators to catch up. 
Although the role of derivatives in the future remains unclear, it is likely these 
instruments are here to stay. According to Fortune, a survey of 200 Chief Executive 
Officers (CEO) from Fortune 500 companies revealed that 92% of these companies will 
continue to use derivatives to some extent (Pare 1994). Thus the business community 
must attempt to arm itself against further losses. The question remains: how? 
Sweeping regulation may only drive the derivatives market off-shore. Promoting 
an increased understanding about derivatives and their risks is the most beneficial way to 
control losses in the near future. In the same Fortune survey mentioned earlier, 40% of 
CEOs feel there is a need to increase education about derivatives (Pare 1994) . A better 
understanding will begin to correct errors occurring in the derivatives market. 
Two types of errors occur in the derivatives market. The first type, an error of 
omission, occurs when an investor fails to analyze sufficiently the instrument before 
purchasing it. The second, an error of commission, results from accepting inappropriately 
high degrees of risk in an attempt to reap short-term benefits. Importantly , we cannot 
continue to escape responsibility: the business community must assign accountability to 
correct these errors and understand derivatives as a risk management tool. 
Therefore, this work intends to promote a better understanding of derivatives for a 
novice investor. Specifically, the author has selected collateralized mortgage obligations 
as a focus. First, this paper will address the growth of the derivatives market, along with 
the reasons for the growing concern surrounding these instruments. Next, the paper will 
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cover the of one of the most complex the collateralized 
obligation (CMO). \.1aterial addresses the structure and inherent characteristics of a 
CMO within an .... "''-''v«L framework. Finally, this paper will present two case studies 
to exemplify the two types of errors in the derivatives marketplace, and the legal 
such errors 
The Growth of the Derivatives Market 
A IS as financial contract whose value depends on ao 
underlying asset, index, or reference rate" (Saul 1994). Derivatives exist as both 
contracts and privately contracts a dealer and an 
user. Exchange-traded contracts to as plain vanillas by derivative are 
the futures and options contracts on supervised exchanges. Privately 
derivatives (known as (OTC) are contracts, such 
as interest rate swaps, arranged between two parties (McGee 1995). (An interest rate 
swap is an two different types and/or rates 
IOterest payments for a specified period of time.) 
have their origin in the late 17th The first 
treatise on contracts, options, hedging, and all the paraphernalia of markets in 
contingent was Joseph de la Published in 1688, 
it was intended the edification of the members of Amsterdam'S Portuguese Jewish 
community who were actively trading of the Dutch India Company after 1650 
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(Hanke 1994). Since this time, exchange-traded derivatives have grown to be a major 
force in the global market. 
The trillion dollar over-the-counter derivatives market was born in the early 
1980's as Wall Street quantitative wizards devised new products to manage risk 
(Greenwald 1994). The driving force behind these developments was the increased need 
to manage risk on an international level. Emerging economies in Latin America, China, 
and the Pacific Rim generated a strong desire for American capital. However, potential 
investors faced risk from exchange rate fluctuations. Wall Street seized the opportunity 
to make money by designing and issuing OTC derivatives to underwrite investor risks 
(Greenwald 1994). 
The potential for a customized product contributed greatly to the growth of 
derivatives. Wall Street quantitative wizards can generate products to serve virtually any 
customer need . Financial experts found ways to expand the base of the underlying 
collateral used for derivatives. Currently, investment houses securitize mortgages, credit 
card receivables, and even aircraft leases. The process of securitization occurs when an 
issuer pools loans into standardized securities backed by these loans, and these new 
securities can then be traded (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 1989). In 1994 the notional 
amount (the amount of the underlying principal) of the derivatives market reached $36 
trillion dollars; equal to three-quarters of the world's stocks, bonds, and money-market 
securities (Smith 1994a). 
The influx of computer technology into the financial markets facilitated the 
creation of derivatives. Computer experts design and monitor risk assessment models to 
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hedge or speculate on minute changes in rates (Greenwald 1994). With the 
of a global marketplace, trading occurs 24 hours a day. The ability of computers 
to track quickly gigantic volumes of product 
customized product growth. 
provided a necessary spark 
this availability of product offerings, investors are very willing to buy. 
According to the -'-'-'''''-'-=='-''-''='-'=' 40% of their treasury 
departments as profit centers, many using derivatives to enhance returns (Smith 1994a). 
As Business School professor Greenwald states, "The 
fundamental of IS they let you buy the you want and 
hedge the risks you don't want, and that is an extraordinarily useful function" (Greenwald 
1994). Derivatives UL.J,,'''LU to investors they aUow one party to pass along 
unwanted risk to another who wishes to assume Thus derivatives may 
either a conservative or a speculative investment. 
rate swaps offer 
speculative investment. When using an interest rate 
either a tool or a 
alone, the investor is gambling 
on the direction of future interest illustrate, assume A to make fixed-
rate payments to Band, 
If interest rates fall, party A loses 
received by party A will decline and 
variable-rate payments from party B. 
The value the variable-rate payments 
A will paying party B a payment 
above current rate. A swap also provides a hedged, or protected, position 
when used in conjunction with a bond portfolio. The owner of the bond portfolio enters 
into an interest rate swap and to the swap 
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counter-party. This counter-party then pays then makes floating-rate payments to the 
owner of the bond portfolio. Entering into the swap agreement while holding a coupon-
paying bond portfolio provides a hedged position with respect to interest rate risk 
(Achstatter (994). 
The Mounting Concern Over Derivatives 
Large investor losses, such as the loss experienced by Orange County, California, 
have made derivatives a dirty word. Today, investing in derivatives is nearly associated 
with scandalous behavior. According to the chairman of Bankers Trust, Charles Sanford, 
"Nobody's going to come out and say anything publicly, because they get skewered by 
the press and everybody else. You know, 'so-and-so's in derivatives'" (Loomis 1995). 
Why did the derivatives losses provoke such great public concern? 
The significant losses experienced by small public institutions and municipalities 
explains some of this public anxiety. Although Proctor & Gamble lost $157 million, 
losses incurred by profitable cOf1)orate entef1)rises do not arouse much public sympathy. 
However, cases such as Escambia County, Florida cause society to take notice. This 
county's $25 million dollar loss from mortgage derivatives caused the road paving 
program to be reduced from $21.2 million to $3.6 million with disastrous results. Last 
year in Escambia County, 100 school buses got stuck in the mud because of the 
predominance of dirt roads (Knecht 1995). When Proctor & Gamble absorbs a loss the 
shareholders pay the price. In the case of Escambia County, taxpayers absorb this loss, as 
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well as the children who 
generated concern (Pare 1994). 
to types far reaching 
The surrounding derivatives dealings led to a securities 
litigation. Several lawsuits have been filed. the outcome which will shape the future 
use of these instruments. For example, Bankers Trust, a large dealer in derivative 
instruments. has been five & Mead Corporation, 
Gibson Carlton Communications, and Air Products. Bankers also faces 
potential lawsuits from its overseas as two Indonesian 
derivative losses (Lipin 1994c). Merrill Lynch has also been heavily criticized and 
a billion lawsuit in connection with the sale of to 
County (Smith 1994b). 
More 
and 
the cri tical issue of lawsuits lies in the conflict between 
In many derivative lawsuits, the investors that a dealer or 
failed to disclose appropriately the associated with the product. The plaintiffs claim 
they were sold unsuitable products and look to recover incurred The 
defendants claim no wrong doing in disclosing risks. Meanwhile, the business 
community waits the outcome which will surely the course of derivatives sales. 
"When the legal dust settles, investors and boards of directors have a much better 
idea what they should and should not be doing. That more than anything will 
the with discipline," Michael Wiseman, a partner at Sullivan and Cromwell 
in New York (Knecht, 1994c). 
7 
The Nature and Emergence of the Collateralized Mortgage Obligation 
Of all derivative available, one of most perplexing 
troublesome is the mortgage-backed derivative, specifically the collateralized 
obligation (CMO). it is so complex, instrument as 
the focus. This paper analyzes of the origin, structure, and the inherent risk 
nee,aea by a to assess the behaviors of a CMO. an 
honest sales is vital the business community wishes to diffuse knowledge 
and understanding to derivative users. A thorough '---"'",,"-,'., is the most 
effective to overcome and prevent more of these en-ors. 
The assets are 
(MBS) which are packaged together and sold as bonds. In essence, collateralized 
obligations are derived In 
form, a mortgage pass-through security is a debt obligation of the issuer secured by 
Ho, That the collateral owned by the 
flow on the debt obligation is paid cash flow received from the underlying 
collateral. Thus, the cash flows by the collateral must be 
sufficient to cover principal and interest payments on the related debt. CMOs are 
a ( or tranche) structure. A tranche is 
one of a group bonds comprising the CMO structure. group bonds in the 
structure is and assigned a priority by which the bonds are Thus 
each tranche receives principal payments according to different maturities (Davidson, Ho, 
and Lim 1994). 
Investor demand for mortgage-backed securities with different times to maturity 
created a strong CMO market (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 1989). The mortgage-backed 
pass-through security was first introduced by the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA) in 1970. Bank of America made the first private issue of similar 
instruments in 1977. Creation of CMOs was the driving force in the mortgage-backed 
securitization in 1983 (Davidson, Ho, and Lim 1994). Wall Street had devised a way to 
carve up the cash flows of mortgages and create value for investors while generating 
profits to security issuers . Between 1984 and 1994 the mortgage-backed securities 
market grew almost tenfold, from $240 billion to an impressive $2 trillion. Currently, 
the value of CMOs outstanding is $750 billion, representing 2% of total derivatives 
outstanding (see Figure 1). Moreover, fifty percent of currently outstanding mortgages 
are securitized (Greenwald 1994). 
Figure 1 
CMOs vs. OTC and Exchange-Traded 
Derivatives 
OTC 
68% 
CMO 
2% 
Exchange-
Traded 
30% 
Source: Smith. Ranoall. "Beleaguered GianI." Wall Street Journal. 25 Augll~t 
1994. pA( I). 
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Using leverage to purchase derivatives helped create the billion dollar CMO 
market. Leverage is defined as an investment position subject to a multiplied effect from 
changes in price due to the use of financing (Davidson, Ho, and Lim 1994). A leveraged 
position is financed through borrowings resulting in a larger risk exposure. Because 
CMOs offer a higher yield than many other investments, money managers with an 
opinion on interest rates used leverage as a way to increase their bets. Using leverage to 
purchase securities with respect to prepayment and interest rate risk on margin provides 
opportunities for some of the biggest gains. Askin Capital Management pursued this 
strategy and remained successful until March 1994 when the market turned against Askin 
(Ehrbar 1994). One author describes speculating with leveraged CMO positions, "In a 
circus, this would be the equivalent of jacking up a jack that was being used to support a 
Mack truck. If the stunt works people applaud; if it collapses they run for the doors" 
(Stone 1994). 
Contributing to the explosive use of CMOs is the high degree of customization 
these instruments offer. CMOs increase the appeal of mortgage-backed securities 
because they enable investors to find investment structures designed for specific needs. 
Arbitrage drives the creation of CMOs. Arbitrage is defined as buying a commodity or 
security in one market and selling the same or similar security in another market, with the 
purpose of taking advantage of price differentials (Davidson, Ho, and Lim 1994). Due to 
the high level of mortgage refinancings between 1992 and 1994, issuers had a plentiful 
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supply of mortgages which they purchased cheaply and turned into CMOs . These CMOs 
were then sold at premiums to customers desiring particular investment characteristics . 
Therefore, the type CMO created is highly dependent on both the market conditions and 
the investor's willingness to pay a premium for a particular type of bond. 
Simple sequential cash flow deals in the CMO market are becoming outdated 
quickly. Ongoing changes in investor demands and the regulatory environment have 
driven those structuring deals to more complex alternatives in carving up ~ollater.CJ.I cash 
flows. For ~xample, in 1987 a CMO structure might have encompassed 5 or 6 tranches, 
whereas in 1992 this number increased to twenty different classes . Today, a CMO 
structure can possess one hundred different tranches of mortgage-backed bonds (Fabozzi, 
Ramsey, and Ramirez 1994). These more complex structures are defined as the "exotics". 
The possibilities for new CMO structures are limitless and the Wall Street wizards 
explore and develop new instruments continually . 
To many investors, CMOs appear to be traditional AAA rated , fixed-debt 
securities. This false perception arises because CMOs are derived from securities issued 
by government-sponsored agencies, such as the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). Although these 
underlying government securities possess a minimal credit risk, the issuer changes their 
nature by allocating cash flow to different tranches. Consequently, these new derived 
instruments behave differently than the original mortgage-backed security. Investors' 
misconception that a CMO behaves similarly to an MBS may partially explain the 
widespread use of mortgage derivatives. 
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Investors' attraction to CMOs was intensified certain interest rate 
movements the economy experienced. For example, 1992 and saw 
of a huge derivatives market. The 150 point (100 basis points equals 1 
point) decline of long-term rates throughout 1992 and 1993 a wave of 
this period, current-coupon, 30 
hit all time highs (Welling 1994). With rates so low, the higher 
yields offered CMOs increased investors' demand for this instrument. Also, CMO 
issues became more profitable because of arbitrage opportunities created by supply 
collateral and a willingness of investors to pay for customized products. 
Just as the last buyers were entering the CMO market, the unexpected happened. 
prices the commodities market along with of an economy 
caused the Federal Board to start raising short-term rates in February In an 
in rates quelled inflation 
brought rates down marginally. Instead, the 25 basis point increase in the 
overnight Federal Funds rate (the rate at which banks may borrow from the 
Federal Bank overnight) a 40 basis point increase in 3D-year 
rate 
portfolios to curtail 
bondholders were forced to quickly liquidate their bond 
(Ehrbar 1994). 
As long-term rates rose in to the 
The duration of 
their value. This interest rate reversal with 
CMO prices to plummet. At this point panic struck the media, the 
l2 
and higher rates 
uncertainty caused 
and the 
market. Bankruptcies appeared, with 
March \994. was officially a dirty word. 
Many investors "got caught" because they lacked sufficient insight to gauge their 
Certainly, some responsibility falls on those CMO dealers who failed 
to disclose, or even misrepresented, 
were by speculative 
of CMO products. In other cases, losses 
bad. A careful analysis of CMO structures and 
the inherent have saved millions of dollars. 
Analysis of the Underlying Mortgage Collateral 
of a simple CMO structure with examination of the underlying 
loan. Essentially, lender of a a claim 
to a cash flow stream comprised both interest and principal payments from the 
homeowner. However, the amount and timing of payments are 
The source of uncertainty from interest rate risk. When rates the 
of the cash flow generated by a con verse is true in a falling 
interest rate environment. A second source of uncertainty from credit a 
cannot or will not honor his/her debt, or if 
falls below the balance of the mortgage outstanding, 
returned to the 1994). 
value of home mortgaged 
full principal amount may not 
The third source of uncertainty from prepayment risk. Prepayment risk is 
born out the embedded option. A borrower 
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the right, or option, to refinance his/her mortgage any time prior to its maturity . The 
mortgagor will exercise this option when the refinancing rate is below the rate of the 
outstanding mortgage (when it is "in the money") . Exercising this option takes value 
away from the mortgage lender. 
In a declining rate environment, the increase in value of a callable mortgage is 
reduced by the probability that the mortgagor will exercise the prepayment option 
("calling the mortgage"). The value of the mortgage is thus compressed towards par, or 
"the strike price". This feature is known as negative convexity among mortgage traders 
(Stone and Zissu 1994) . How is this risk passed on to a holder of a mortgage-backed 
security? The mortgagor's call option exposes the mortgage-backed securities investor to 
the risk that mortgagors will prepay their mortgages at a rate other than the expected rate 
built into the price of the MBS. 
The building block for a CMO lies in the cash flows generated by a mortgage 
loan. A CMO exists as a series of cash flows which are carved from the cash flows 
generated by the mortgage. Specific CMO structures reflect the amount and availability 
of raw mortgage cash flows in the market. Because the refinancings of 1992 and 1993 
provided a great supply of cash, Wall Street was able to increase the amount and 
complexity of its product. 
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Analysis of Risk Factors Associated with Collateralized Mortgage Obligation 
Mortgage derivatives present new investment problems which require different 
levels of analysis. Investors can no longer apply similar tools to all types of bonds and 
strategies. The growth in the mortgage derivatives market has magnified the financial 
consequences of a market move, yet has thwarted traditional investment analysis. 
Traditional analysis fails because of its focus on economics as opposed to the dynamics of 
the international market (Ehrbar 1994). 
Given today's complex deal structures, understanding these derivatives can prove 
difficult. How much analysis is necessary? An investor over-analyzing and applying 
every test may lose the opportunity to make a timely investment deci~ion; the instrument 
would probably be traded away in this time. Improvements have been made in volatility 
and suitability measures to help investors judge how much analysis is necessary to feel 
comfortable with various bond structures. However, further improvements are necessary 
to increase a buyer's ability to recognize both risk and value. 
Most big dealers have sophisticated systems in place to measure and manage 
complex risks. The 1994 Central Bank Report of the "Group of Ten" member banks 
identifies the results of such systems as proprietary with respect to the dealers. As a 
result "a gap exists between the precision with which a firm's management can assess its 
financial risks and the information available to outsiders, including clients" (Granito 
1994). Investors can narrow this gap by identifying the nature and origin of risk assigned 
IS 
to the deal. Understanding a derivative product requires a focus on basic elements and 
tradeoffs common to all financial transactions: risk and return. According to John Succo, 
the managing director of derivatives with Paine Webber in New York, "All derivatives 
really do is break apart the components of risk of the underlying securities. The problem 
is that some people who use the derivatives don't understand the components of risk" 
(Indiana Alumni News 1994) . 
One of the primary risk characteristics associated with CMOs is the credit risk of 
the underlying issuer. To an untrained person, CMOs appear very similar to high-
yielding government bonds. Although the traditional mortgage pass-through securities 
from which CMOs are derived may boast high ratings, the issuer buys these securities and 
changes their structure. As discussed earlier, the resulting CMO represents a new 
instrument. Thus the credit risk of a CMO depends on the identity of the issuer who 
bought the NiBS securities and carved them up, rather than on the risk of the underlying 
collateral. 
Issuers of CMOs fall into two categories. An issuer is either a govemment-
sponsored entity, such as the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal 
National Mortgage Association, or a private entity. CMOs issued by a government-
sponsored agency are known as agency CMOs whereas those CMOs issued by a private 
agency are referred to as private-label CMOs. 
The credit guarantee of a government-sponsored agency depends upon two 
factors: the financial ability of such an agency to service its obligations and the 
willingness of the United States government to rescue this agency should it be incapable 
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of meeting obligations. Private-label CMOs are rated by commercial credit rating 
agencies and necessitate investigation prior to purchase. Furthermore, those buying 
agency CMOs must remember that although the government may guarantee the credit of 
the underlying collateral, the risks arise from homeowners pay their 
mortgages. for which there is no guarantee. 
The question of "when" to the most perplexing risk of a 
CMO. cash flows generated by a mortgagor paying off a mortgage can be broken 
into three ingredients: the the portion, and any payments in 
excess the regularly scheduled principal payment. This last element, the prepayment 
portion, represents an unknown variable. 
In examining prepayment risk, it is helpful to consider the vLv ..... ,.'U of a CMO. An 
individual investor who buys a mortgage loan the prepayment risk from that one 
However, if an issuer buys twenty and pools them, could 
fund its purchase by using this pool as collateral for the issuance of mortgage pass-
throughs. The flows associated with the pass-throughs would be based 
directly based on cash flow generated by the twenty mortgages. Thus, an individual 
could now in a mortgage pass-through security which exposes him or her 
to prepayment risk spread over the twenty mortgages. The total amount of prepayment 
risk remains and 1994). 
CMOs allocate this risk unequally to different investors. Instead of 
distributing principal on a rata basis, principaJ is distributed on a prioritized basis. 
Various of bonds are created with the sum of their total par to the 
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original price paid for the mortgages. class of bond is further subdivided into units 
which are sold and 
bond. 
a proportionate share of the payments received by this class of 
Complexity because of the rules determining when each class of bonds will 
payments. example, assume X must all 
payments and prepayments until par value is met before Y begins receiving 
principal payments (known as "paying down"). behavior of class Y depends on the 
behavior of class which in turn depends on how fast homeowners off their 
mortgages. One CMO may contain any combination of rules dictating the amount and 
timing of principal ~nd interest payments to be allocated among the various bond 
Although the may seem the resulting instrument may be 
complex 
of bonds. 
it combines of many rules over dozens of tranches 
Evaluating the prepayment risk of a CMO begins by using a b!isic'"measure, the 
speed. Adopted by the Public Securities Association in the 1980s, the 
is a market convention which assumes prepayment rates, a conditional 
prepayment rate (CPR), follow a standard path over time. (The CPR is a percentage 
prepayment rate which outstanding balance 
100% curve assumes the prepayment rate starts at 
.2670 until the thirtieth month when it levels off at 6% 
on an 
the 
basis.) A 
month and rises by 
Equation 1). The 
assumption PSA is 100% and faster are expressed as multiples of the base model. 
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For example, a 200% PSA means mortgage loans will rise to 12% over the thirty month 
period (see Figure 2). 
a:: 
a.. 
u 
Equation 1 
PSA = conditional prepayment rate 
m in (age 30) x .2 
Figure 2 
PSA COMPARISON 
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Traditionally, mortgage securities were analyzed using static prepayment analysis. 
A static analysis consists of forecasting prepayments based on a long-term average PSA 
model. However, evaluating a complex CMO structure based on a long-term average in a 
volatile market proved fatal for some CMO investors. One author equates the PSA model 
to a "funhouse mirror; the PSA model distorts reality and makes meaningful comparison 
difficult" (Davidson, Ho, and Lim 1994). 
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The long-term PSA forecast is inaccurate for two reasons: the aging flaw and the 
burnout flaw. The aging flaw arises because the PSA model normally assumes that all 
mortgages take thirty months to reach their peak CPR. Unfortunately , we know from 
experience that all loans age differently, and thus the PSA curve does not accurately fit 
the aging patterns of all loan pools. Figure 3 shows how the aging period for 
prepayments on a 7% FHLMC Gold 30-year MBS (the underlying collateral of the CMO 
consists of 30-yr MBS issued by the FHLMC with a 7% coupon) originated in March 
1993 was significantly shorter than the PSA model predicted. 
a: 
a. 
() 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
0 
J93 
Figure 3 
FHLMC 30 Year 
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J94 J95 J96 J97 J98 J99 JOO 
Time (J=January) 
Source: Davidson, Andrew. Thomas Ho, and Yung Lim. Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligariom. (Chicago: Probus Publishing. 1994) 106. 
The burnout flaw of the PSA model arises because of the assumption that 
prepayment rates wiLl remain constant after thirty months. Most likely, prepayments will 
begin to fade after hitting a peak prepayment level. Figure 4 shows the prepayment 
pattern for Federal National Mortgage Association 8s (8% coupon MBS collateral issued 
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by the FNMA) plotted against the PSA model. The significant differences between the 
two lines should indicate to an investor that PSA predictions cannot be trusted. 
0.7 
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II: 0.4 
a. 
U 0.3 
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Source: Davidson. Andrew. Thomas Ho. and Yung Lim. Collateralized 
Mortgage Ohligations. (Chicago: Probus Publishing. 1994) pi 06. 
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How do the flaws embedded within the PSA prepayment model generate 
problems for investors? Without an accurate model from which to predict prepayments , 
the investor has little foundation on which to gauge the duration of the CMO investment. 
An environment of increasing prepayment speeds will return money much faster than 
expected, exposing the investor to reinvestment risk. Conversely, an investor may find 
the duration of a CMO greatly extended in a slowing prepayment environment. During 
1992 and 1993 declining interest rates caused investors to pay back mortgages quickly, 
making it difficult for investors to hold onto assets . Therefore, many CMO investors 
simply dumped more money into mortgage derivati ves rather than face investing in a 
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lower yielding When rates increased in J 994, the duration of 
CMO bonds extended and their value plummeted. 
It was not the flaws the PSA prepayment model alone which 
unanticipated risk. The extraordinary rate movements between I 1994 
created prepayment whipsaws. A whipsaw is a sharp movement followed by a quick 
These whipsaws were created the tendency prepayments in a volatile 
market to peak one month and the next. Whipsaws create certain behaviors in 
CMO structures which cannot be predicted by long-term average 
to support the extension risk by 
prepayment levels in a CMO structure are known as the support tranche. 
principal payments the bonds only 
down. bonds support more risk (due to longer dates to maturity), they are 
by high PSA levels and whipsaw scenarios. PSA model 
assumes that a of900 PSA one month and a speed of 
next month results in the long-term performance of a CMO structure guided by an 
speed of 600. the high level of within the 
month will have caused of the bonds in the structure to unexpectedly 
flows (as dictated rules) and may have resulted in some down 
entirely. In the next month slowed structure will much 
differently. Because some tranches the structure have been paid down, the remaining 
are exposed to is completely if 
under the static of a 600 (Davidson, Ho, Lim 1994). 
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The sensitivity of CMOs to whipsaws an investor holding 
an investment whose nature resembles little of the original purchase. One author 
the whipsaw phenomena to a pilot flying into a "100 mph headwind. 
(the pilot) that he can still make the trip according to the planned schedule 
since he would have a favorable 100 mph tailwind on the way Is he right? No, 
would .. (twice as 
Ho, and Lim 1994). Therefore, the 
in later of slowed 
) for the first part of the trip" (Davidson, 
of a current prepayment 
levels. 
may not be 
One method of forecasting, called vector analysis, presents a more accurate 
of CMO A vector is a course or direction, and thus a vector analysis 
examines the behavior a CMO under different prepayment directions. Using vectors 
reflects more precisely prepayment volatility and thus 
Moreover, vector analysis that the allocation of cash flow is not a simple 
of "when" they will occur. It allows an examination a variety of 
Vector analysis with the bond's performance over a wide 
of prepayment scenarios. For example, it might consider what happens when rates go up 
or down 150 basis points then reverse direction (Welling 1994). vectors 
performance under short-term prepayment expectations, long-term forecasts, and 
volatility under whipsaws. Investors should observe how the duration and value of the 
bonds in a CMO structure change a variety of before deciding to use this 
instrument. 
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Investors can develop a simple vector analysis with several rules of thumb. 
Analysis of a CMO's 
scenario should represent 
second should an 
should include at The first 
current month CPR rate as forecasted by the PSA. The 
to the likely prepayment speed 
collateral market conditions. Finally, a third should use the long-term 
average projection (Davidson, Ho, and 1994). Any analysis of a CMO over a 
of vectors more useful than a constant PSA evaluation. The concept appears 
arose from the failure to predict CMO in a changing rate 
environment. 
The optionality embedded in the underlying collateral presents complex 
valuation considerations for the A 1'."'- UWv1\.l...u securi ty' s is 
akin to owning normal 
to buy an asset at a 
interest rate calls ~AU'H'J them. (A call is the 
an expiration date.) on or 
caBs the 
this 
the right, but not the obligation, to prepay at time. 
only to this option when rates fall and 
such an action is detrimental to the MBS the investor demands a yield. The 
valuation of a CMO revolves around these option-related components, or the ability 
borrower to the of cash thus the 
value of instrument (Welling 1994). 
Various analytical exist aCMO, basic 
analysis, to advanced spread and return techniques. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) 
model provides a method for CMO on curve. By 
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the value options embedded in a mortgage bond's structure, the OAS 
turns a risky CMO bond into a "Treasury equivalent" (risk-free government bond). 
The difference between the CMO bond and risk- bond represents 
compensation for the risk assumed by the holder of the debt (Klein and Lederman 
1994 ). 
The option-adjusted computation has four rate 
simulation, prepayment the MBS cash generation. leading to the 
solution. Figure 5 this that dealers jJVC',,\J,)" varymg for 
inputs, OAS process fails a consistent gauge relative value (KJein 
and Lederman 1994). will not intricate details of 
optionality analysis; point is simply to show how even an advanced method of 
analysis when applied to CMOs. I a fixed-income 
with Solon Asset Management in California, securities were complicated enough 
and had enough different kinds of optionality that even sophisticated 
analysis OAS didn't help that much. And besides that area is a black box for most 
people" (Welling 1994). 
OAS Model 
Rate Simulation 
I 
Prepayment Model 
I 
Cash Flow Generation 
I 
OAS Solution 
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Because CMOs complex risk liquidity risk becomes 
another concern. As rates early 1994, CMOs 
plummeted in and the gamblers who had bought them, often with borrowed money, 
had to dump them quickly, driving even Furthermore, the customization 
CMOs often make them unattractive and difficult to All computer 
models are in a panicked market 
With such liquidity risks, it is possible, and , that a CMO investor 
could lose everything before being to act. to World's Central Bank 
Report, "During of market stress this lack of transparency can contribute to an 
environment in which rumors alone can cause a access and funding to 
impaired" (Granito 1994). From February to December 1994, the 
tremendous volatility and still suffers from decreased liquidity, especially for 
the more exotic Dealers are not quoting with the same frequency, bids 
are scarce, and at extremely low values as compared to the theoretical model 
values (Goodman 1994). 
Studies 
discussing the risks which an assumes 
. \ buymg a 
CMO, this paper now discllss two examples of errors in these 
case is the story Odessa Due to an error of 
commission this college has serious The second case will discuss 
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how an error of omission can harm CMO investors. Unethical sales practices, in 
combination with uneducated and unsophisticated investors, has generated financial 
setbacks for several Ohio municipalities and legal action against several salesmen from 
Hart Securities in Houston, Texas. 
I. Error of Commission: Gambler's Anonymous? 
Odessa College is a two-year public institution of higher learning located in West 
Texas. For most of the college's history, it pursued a conservative investment strategy 
using bank certificate of deposits and maintaining enough cash to cover several months of 
operating costs. However, in 1990 because of a desire to renovate the campus and offset 
a decline in other revenues, the college departed from caution. 
Dr. Roger Coomer, vice-president of finance, was in charge of virtually all the 
college's resources: long-term investment funds, proceeds of bond sales, state payments, 
tax revenues, tuition payments, even funds belonging to the booster club. In 1990, he 
began to invest these funds in complicated mortgage derivatives. Eventually, the 
portfolio Coomer managed consisted of CMOs including a portion made up of exotic 
CMOs known as principal-only strips. (A principal-only strip only entitles the holder of 
the CMO to the cash flows resulting from repayments of principal on the collateral.) 
These derivatives were bought from a variety of dealers, including Gruntal and Company, 
Government Securities Corporation, and Westcap Corporation (Knecht 1994b). 
Initially, Coomer's strategy worked. In fiscal 1991, he earned $1.5 million in 
interest and capital gains on Odessa College's investment for an eleven percent return. In 
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fiscal 1 he earned million for a seventeen percent return, and 1993 brought a 
million gain for a hefty twenty-three percent return. Encouraged by this success 
continued to add to his derivatives investment. By the close of 1 Odessa Col1ege 
position effecti vely a bet that rates would to fall 
(Knecht 1994b). 
Investing money and portfolio was not a new to Dr. 
Coomer. While pursuing his doctorate education, he wrote a doctoral thesis on 
educational insti tutions. titled Development 
Financial to fund Capital for Community Colleges" was 
by Tech University in 1992 (Knecht 1994b). Coomer was sophisticated 
enough to price-shop several dealers, and could identify specific securities he 
wanted than seeking consultation: "Unlike he would tell us 
exactly what wanted down to the cusip number," one broker who products to 
Coomer 1994c). 
managed his portfolio in a manner indicative a sophisticated trader 
returns rather than stability. Coomer handled portfolio with 
approach of a example, during 1993 he bought $90 million 
which he resold the end of the . According to Frank 
a dealer with Corporation, was buying to trade, not 
the long-term." (Knecht 1994b). Government was so impressed by 
and initial success that it even him to speak at a seminar institutional 
investors it held in October 1993 (Knecht 1 
Notably, in July of 1993 several of the college's trustees expressed concerns and 
Coomer agreed to reduce the college's risk exposure. This proved to be a short-lived 
agreement as Coomer added $12.7 million of derivatives to the portfolio between 
September 30 and December 30, 1993 (Knecht 1994c) . Even some of the brokers who 
made money selling derivatives to Coomer thought he held too much risk. Senior 
managers with Government Securities Corp. expressed concern that Odessa College's 
assets were too concentrated. "He gave us the general message that he knew what he was 
doing," says Klaus (Knecht 1994b). The concern of another one of Coomer's dealers, 
Coastal Securities, prompted the firm to require Dr. Coomer and the college's president 
to sign a waiver certifying they understood the risks and volatility of the mortgage 
deri vati ves they purchased. 
Just after Coomer's last buying spree, rates began to rise in early 1994. As Odessa 
College's portfolio dropped in value, colleagues claim Coomer became 
uncommunicative. Finally on March 21, 1994, Coomer revealed to the college's 
president that its financial situation was critical. One week later he sold $6.3 million of 
derivatives for a $2.7 million loss . In the weeks to follow, the remaining investments 
declined in value and became too difficult to sell at any price (Knecht 1994c). 
Over this time period, Odessa's $21.9 million portfolio declined to half that price. 
By October 1994, Odessa had added an additional $10 million in debt and still had the 
derivatives. As a result of its investment strategy, the college increased tuition by twenty 
percent and borrowed $10.5 million on an emergency basis. Twenty-two senior 
professors received early retirement and the college president, Phillip Speegle, is forgoing 
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his $122,000 salary. Even the air conditioning was eliminated, in an environment where 
temperatures climbed over 105 degrees for sixteen days in July. Unfortunately, the 
complex and abstract world of mortgage derivatives will be very real for the students 
forced to swelter through uncomfortable classroom conditions (Knecht 1994b). 
As a result of these losses, the college filed a lawsuit against one of its derivatives 
dealers. Gruntal and Company. In the lawsuit, Odessa College claims that Gruntal and 
Company failed to disclose the potential volatility and inherent risks of $2.8 million of 
derivatives sold to the university. While Dr. Coomer himself has not been accused of any 
improprieties, he has disappeared. Gruntal and Company claims that Dr. Coomer was 
inarguably sophisticated enough to understand the risks he was taking and cites the claim 
as "devoid of merit" (Knecht 1994b) . 
The manner in which Dr. Coomer managed his portfolio reveals his losses resulted 
from errors of commission. Associates claim Coomer was eager to impress colleagues 
and dealers with his skill, and although he hasn't been located, administrators have 
acknowledged that Coomer knew his impressive returns were related to increased risks . 
Rising interest rates slowed prepayments on mortgages and caused the duration of Odessa 
College's CMOs to lengthen and lose value. A liquidity crunch exacerbated losses as 
Coomer was unable to find buyers for his investments. 
Coomer was certainly knowledgeable enough to have predicted such a scenario . 
Yet for some unknown reason, he simply continued to "bet the college" based solely on 
his opinion about interest rates and previous returns . According to Sue Blair, faculty 
president at the time , "he thought everything he touched turned to gold" ("Local Heroes, 
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...:..:.-::::.::.:c..;;::...::.=...:;..;~==, 1994). highly volatile and risky mortgage 
derivatives to enhance short-run returns was clearly an inappropriate strategy for a small 
public college. Any institution which cannot or afford potential 
losses should not invest so heavily in such instruments. Solving the derivatives problem 
of solid above impulsiveness. It is not simply to 
have knowledge and expertise about CMOs; one must apply such knowledge a 
constructive and manner. 
II. Error Of Omission: Look Before You Leap 
Unlike which had a knowledgeable fund Ohio 
school 
later 
invested mortgage derivatives without sufficient understanding and 
some of the sales 
employed LlUvlvUUJ,H sales practices to belie and mask the risk components. 
error of omission a dual responsibility; blame to only one 
party is Buyers of securities an obligation to their organization to 
from assuming risks they don't understand. 
responsibility for honest disclosures and suitable 
by most taxpayers, some of 
been and school 
to raise funds, may unadvisedly assume 
also have a 
institutions hit hardest by derivative 
institutions, under 
risks. Municipalities 
routinely place cash through taxes and public borrowings in 
accounts to earn extra revenue. When rates in I and I many municipalities 
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term to earn a higher yield. Furthermore, 
treasurers under considerable pressure to earn a higher return as 
opposed to new taxes. from the community fund 
managers an awkward position. 
Securities Houston, Texas, a 
such to sell 
in mortgage 
Ohio school 
played upon 
a variety 
CMOs. with 
to build 
other Houston based firms, played a crucial 
role in Wall trillion 
Houston firms provided a constant demand for 
security market. 
derivatives that Wall Street 
could not 
and sold 
to institutions. regional bought these CMOs 
to small, unsophisticated institutions and 
Salespeople at Hart were required to make at least four attempts to close a sale 
during Whenever a customer hung the salespeople called right Mr. 
Hart claims he has been very successful by training his salesforce never to take "no" 
an answer. One former all new salespeople (who 
were usually new to the securities industry as had only days of before 
a list of prospects. 
pressure to sell was intense. Mr. 
compensation was based solely on commission, the 
who had as a used car 
salesman, initially worried that his lack of training ill-equipped him to talk 
securities with However, he quickly that clients were not 
sophisticated: "Most them didn't know anything beyond what a CD was" (Knecht 
I 994f). 
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As previously stated, the pressure tactics employed by Hart's salesforce often 
included misrepresenting the risks associated with CMOs. Houston for 
example, did not understand or to mention the risk components associated 
with evaluating and valuing CMO behaviors. salesman presents the sales 
pitch used to sell derivatives to small towns and institutions. The selling 
point obviously misrepresents the credit risk with a CMO and implies a 
deceptive amount of safety. 
"This is Patrick McLaughlin with Hart Securities. I hadn't anticipated 
back so soon, but my showed me so exceptional 
I had to call you. You're with Maes aren't you? Then 
you are aware that Fannie Maes are backed by the full faith and credit of 
the US you? Then you're with safety 
you?" (Knecht 1994f) 
Rosalie Townsend, treasurer the public schools in Vermillion, Ohio, began 
calls Kenneth Schulte of Hart Securities in August 1991. November 
1991, Mr. Schulte eventually sold $200,000 of to Vermillion which Rosalie 
Townsend accepted as being securities. In their negotiations, MS.Townsend 
specifically told Mr. Schulte that of principal was vital, and that 
instruments were safe. However, when the district sold CMOs in October 
1993, it recouped only $16,000 of its original $200,000 investment (Knecht 1994f). 
In actuality, Hart Securities sold Vermillion risky CMOs known as 
strips. (An interest-only strip entitles the holder the CMO to the cash flows resulting 
from interest payments on the underlying collateraL) Mr. Schulte did not disclose how 
instruments could to changing interest rates. Vermillion did not 
the nature its purchase enough to that it was only entitled to the 
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interest portions of the underlying mortgage cash flows. As prepayments accelerated in 
1993 refinancings evaporated the underlying mortgage collateral, and thus interest cash 
flows disappeared as well. 
After the Vermillion troubles, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit 
against Schulte. The SEC seeks an injunction against Schulte from continuing his 
controversial sales practices of describing mortgage derivatives as "safe and secure" and 
as "guaranteed by the US government" (Bailey 1994). This case represents the first action 
taken by the SEC against a broker for selling these types of derivatives to a public body. 
The SEC called Schulte's behavior "egregious, given the amount of money lost and the 
lack of sophistication of the municipal investors ... " (Rutchick 1994). Mary Keefe, 
regional director of the SEC in Chicago, claims this suit is part of a larger investigation 
into improper sales of risky securities to municipalities across the country. As for Mr. 
Schulte, he is currently selling mortgage derivatives for another brokerage firm in Florida 
and still contends that derivatives "are easy to understand and ... do not entail a large 
degree of risk" (B ailey 1994). 
Legal Issues 
The outcome of the derivatives litigation will certainly set the course for future 
derivatives sales and transactions. These lawsuits will largely turn on two questions: did 
the dealer clearly disclose the risks of the derivative and was the CMO appropriate and 
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for the buyer's investment scheme? As for the answer 
determining what types of disclosures are the responsibility of a dealer. Disclosing risks 
a CMO investment should include presentation of the impact of changing 
a test" , as a vector analysis. Furthermore, should show customers 
which valuation model dealer uses, and explain why it selected the specific 
inputs for that model (Welling 1994). 
It is important also to 
terms. An interview with a 
dealer will often present a 
Yet the terms the 
information about in understandable 
firm that a derivatives 
and respond truthfully to questions when 
is too for 
the to gain a proper understanding risks involved (Audit Partner, 1995). 
this information in to understand terms will 
required the investor and, ultimately, the time and on litigation. 
Introducing swift liability dealers with unethical sales practices may prove 
difficult today's Until new regulations involving practices are 
or 
passed, no foundation for proving derivatives To date, standards concerning 
the of are ambiguous at Section 1 O(b) the 1934 and 
it unlawful "for any person ... to 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
In any or 
on any person, in 
the connection with the or of " (Pany and 1991 ). 
However, most derivatives do not currently fall under the normal definition of a security 
which of lOeb). 
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the responsibility of a dealer to assess the suitability of particular 
products for customers introduces complicated legal Clearly, Mr. Schulte of 
Hart failed to provide disclosures. Should he, be to 
assess whether it was appropriate for Rosalie Townsend to invest CMOs at all? The 
answer to this question the nature of relationshi p between customer. 
If relationship includes providing both financial advice derivative products, the 
broker/dealer may arguably be expected, by virtue of the advisory relationship. to make 
sure customer understands the workings of the and place in risk 
If not, the customer may have to fend for or herself. 
'-'"'-'''''''''' is heated over 
Mike Dontje, head of derivatives operations with 
suitability. An interview with 
KeyCorp in Cleveland, Ohio, 
both Dontje believes that ethical 
should be implemented to protect customers, "You can't sell a thirty-year bond to a 
old man." it is a responsibility to risk 
(Dontje 1 
don't think 
partner, Michael Joseph states, "1 
the responsibility to how much a corporation should 
( Achstatter 1994). The ...:...:...:=-:==.::..=== surveyed 100 treasurers and 
to determine whether the dealer, end-user, or both should responsible for 
risk. Only thirteen of respondents thought it was the 
responsibility, 57% said it was a shared responsibility ("Derivatives Risk Should 
Shared", __ :~-"~="-~.~~'''== 1995). 
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Examination of the buyer/seller relationship reveals many sources.of problems in 
the derivatives market. When buyers establish what Dontje calls "too cozy of a 
relationship" with the dealers, they may lose the ability to be objective (Dontje 1995) . A 
mistake of small investors may be a failure to get competitive bids. On the other hand, 
financing a client's purchase may open the door to liability. For example, Merrill Lynch 
is now being sued for its extensive involvement with Orange County, California. Merrill 
Lynch underwrote a $600 million note issue, the proceeds of which were used to purchase 
more risky derivatives, expediting Orange County's bankruptcy. The reliance on Wall 
Street to play all roles in the mortgage derivatives market may conflict with the 
independent check and balance system found in other markets. Forthe derivatives 
market, Wall Street is the originator, issuer, seller, and underwriter; all it needs is 
investors' money to buy the product (Welling 1994). 
Despite the arguments presented above, it appears as if dealers may have to accept 
more responsibility for assessing product suitability for their derivative customers . A 
recent circular on derivative transactions issued by the Comptroller of the Currency 
suggests that an institution may have an obligation to provide disclosure about the 
product and to assess the appropriateness of the transaction for the customer. Implicit in 
this document was the possibility of incurring a liability for the failure to do either 
(Wiseman and Simmons 1994) . Putting new responsibility on the dealers should not, 
however, impact the buyer's degree of research, evaluation, and even skepticism. Buyers 
should be warned that the dealer's goal is not simply better client relations, but to move 
its product and increase its own wealth. 
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Conclusion 
shockwave throughout the financial markets from mortgage derivatives 
was not predicted by Wall Street's and brightest. Big resulting the 
Federal Reserve's 1994 increase in short-term rates were unexpected. The 
In rates was only intended to slow slightly (Millman 1995). 
because so much money on mortgage cash flows, the market saw unexpected 
Never before had prepayment whims of such a 
sphere of influence. 
previously well-understood a 
hidden the financial community. That no one really understood or could 
the 
"No one had really paid much attention to the mortgage securities market 
before. it was driving the monetary vehicle ... 
old rules no longer applied. It just that markets had 
bigger or more volatile. were behaving in ways that no one 
had ever predicted they could" (Millman 1995). 
Alvin Toffler's 1970 book ~=.;=-=:.:.;:;...:= is a prediction what come to 
explained technology as a function knowledge and, thus, the more we know, the more 
we create. Mortgage derivatives are financial of our quickly 
knowledge and technology. The remains exactly as Toffler predicted: 
innovations cause change at a rate faster than can absorb. 
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Regulators have to keep up with the innovations in the derivatives 
market. In March 1995, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reached an 
with Wall Street's largest firms: Goldman 
Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Solomon Brothers. This 
voluntary agreement set tighter on derivatives and trading (Taylor 1995). 
securities firms to regular disclosures to about their internal 
risk management approaches. Importantly, investment houses also to give 
written statements highlighting the of to all customers 
derivatives. This indicate further regulatory by the 
voluntary 
"It's 
are at hand, but currently the no power to 
compromise. According to Hill, a law professor at University of 
a code conduct, and it could a long way toward pre-empting direct legislative 
action on by (Taylor 1995). 
these standards may lessen the frequency of errors of omission. 
The users of a responsibillty to 
the the instruments buy. However, the also recognizes 
that customers should a derivative product's worth 
(Taylor 1 ~h"""""h a dealer's responsibillty honest sales may 
swift punishment blatant violators such as Kenneth 
Schulte. 
Also, allows to dealers' capital based 
on the disclosures made by the dealers. Such an evaluation presents 
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dealers use proprietary models to measure and value derivative positions. The possibility 
that developed and closely-guarded models would public caused the 
firms initially to such disclosures. The agreement resolved this difficulty 
allowing firms to continue to use private models under two conditions: First, the 
models must adhere to minimum standards with the S and 
secondly, the firms must submit models to outside auditors. The will 
verify that on standards (Taylor 1995). 
However, auditing a complicated derivative transaction effectively is a 
guidance 
Moreover, few guidelines for 
credibility of 
derivative transactions. 
Financial Standards Board undertook a limited in 1993 
on disclosures about derivative instruments which it completed in October 1994 (Bullen 
and P011erfieid 1994). Although this a first step 
ambiguous. Whether 
can help correct the errors of omission remains to be seen. 
disclosures will add value only if the investor understands them. 
better disclosure, 
the auditing function 
information and 
implementing any new regulations the derivatives market, 
rule-making bodies should consider the importance of derivatives to the 
American playa key role in the formation of capital and risk 
In today's fast-moving marketplace, derivatives provide a much-needed 
tlexibility for and have 
(Smith 1994a). For example, Betsy manager of 
effecti vely 
markets at Mobil 
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Corporation, claims her group saved approximately $4 billion "as a result of my having 
heard the word 'swap' in 1989" (Smith 1994a). 
Furthermore, regulators should consider the involvement of several government-
sponsored agencies in the derivatives market. Agencies such as the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, and the Federal 
Home Bank System are responsible for issuing exotic derivatives . For example, 
problems in the Orange County, California investment fund partially resulted from the 
presence of derivatives issued by FNMA (Smith 1994b). If the Wall Street dealers 
encounter new regulations, then the rule-making bodies can argue for tightening 
restrictions 6n the government agencies with whom the dealers work closely. 
The government-sponsored agencies (such as those listed above) became involved 
with derivatives for several reasons . Their need for funds to finance mortgages and other 
loans makes them very sensitive to small differences in their cost of borrowing. 
Secondly, the sponsorship of the government entitles these agencies to a AAA credit 
rating which is attractive to investors. Also, Wall Street dealers find it simpler to use 
these agencies to develop exotic new debt structures because debt issues of these agencies 
do not have to be registered publicly (Smith 1994b). 
In the past, the government-sponsored agencies have relied on Wall Street and the 
customers to assess the suitability of the product. A spokesperson for the Federal Home 
Loan Bank System claims, "We believe its incumbent on investors throughout the 
marketplace to understand the securities they are buying" (Smith 1994b). The agencies 
now fear that association between their names and some of the derivatives aggressively 
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on Wall may provoke a backlash. Such regulation could 
these agencies' "legal privilege" to imprint the government's name on their debt, which 
describes as, "one of our most valuable corporate assets" (Smith 
1994b). Consequently, ment (such as the SEC) may find 
battling Wall Street dealers as well as other government 
If further regulatory action is on regulators must 
new rules may have on the economies other countries. The derivatives market is 
deeply intertwined with securities markets world and, therefore, actions in the 
deri vati ves market have international implications. example, over the past 
two years Wall has sold many derivatives with maturities one to two years 
whose is on the of the (known as a 
structured note). the sharp devaluation Mexican in December 
1994, derivatives declined in value investors are rapidly selling these 
swift to value of the downwards, 
exacerbating Mexico's current financial crisis (Vogel 1 
With a tremendous of exist as a dominant 
international financial force. The notional value of derivatives outstanding in August 
1994 exemplifies the grown. 6 reveals that 
the notional value of these instruments approximates of value of outstanding 
stocks, bonds, money -market world-wide. 
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Figure 6 
The Value of Derivatives Outstanding vs. Traditional 
Securities 
Traditional 
Securities 
Outstanding (in 
. billions) 
$47800 I 
Derivatives 
Outstanding (in 
billions) 
I $35848 [ 
Source: Smith, Randall. "Beleaguered Giant."J.YaLl 
Street Journal, 25 August 1994. pA(1). 
The derivatives market probably would not have grown to this size without the time lag 
between the evolution of derivatives and regulatory action. Had stringent regulations 
existed in the early 1980s, some of the amazing financial technology may not have 
occurred. According to Andrew Davidson, head of a derivatives research firm, "The 
concept of derivatives stems back at least to the Bible. In Genesis, God began creation by 
separating light from darkness ... to limit derivatives is to limit creation" (Smith 
1994b). 
These financial innovations are not viscous instruments designed by Wall Street 
to prey upon unsophisticated investors . They are creations of financial brilliance which 
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were unfortunately misunderstood by many investors. Any regulatory actions appearing 
in the near future will likely consist of more voluntary such as the 
between the major Wall Street dealers and the 
(Dontje 1 These voluntary compromises are the best type regulatory action 
could take because they place accountability for understanding derivatives 
it belongs: with the The towards the errors in the 
market is and care allocated to understanding derivatives. 
As a reminder to prone to gambling with high-risk stakes: no amount education, 
or disclosure can 
1 For a detailed analysis of the OAS model refer to Ho and Lim, 1994. 
2 Companies under SEC include those (1) whose securities are listed on a national stock 
or with equity securities traded on the over-the-counter market, and total assets $5 
million and 500 or more stockholders. 
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Exhibit I 
I. What exactly is your professional title and what are your primary employment 
responsibilities? 
What is your educational professional background? 
3. Would you say your exposure to derivatives is slight, moderate, or 
4. are the primary sort you have to? 
5. Do you to buy or derivative 
and if so what? 
6. Which side the buy/sell you yourself more involved 
in? 
Why do you many investors· found exposed to 
much more risk than they originally thought they were entering into? 
8. How much does your organization before investing in 
derivatives, and more specifically a structure, if applicable? 
If you were to a CMO, what kind of information regarding its specific risk 
components would you from the of the 
10. What is the most dangerous risk component a CMO? 
11. What is the way to gauge prepayment ofa structure? 
12. much risk of a CMO responsible 
to investor? 
13. How do you so got 
14. Are the current derivatives problems the result the design of 
or way they have used? 
15. What do you see happening in the derivatives market as a 
wave of litigation? 
providing 
instrument 
of the current 
